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The distinction between ‘value’ and ‘riches’ was first highlighted by Ricardo 
(1821) in Chapter XX, ‘Value and Riches, their distinctive Properties’, of his 
Principles. Ricardo’s aim was to clear up Smith’s famous statement that “every man 
is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the 
necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human life” (1776, Bk.I, Ch.V; italics 
added). 
Indeed, Smith’s statement was ambiguously worded in at least three different 
senses. First, because it is unclear whether the ‘necessaries, conveniences, and 
amusements of human life’ are all those which constitute ‘wealth in itself’ according to 
Cantillon’s canonical definition or only those which are the result of ‘human exertion’. 
Secondly, because the expression ‘can afford to enjoy’ is not as precise as the 
expression (which it seems to replace) ‘can afford to purchase in order to enjoy’. 
Thirdly, because, in so far as it comes to ‘human exertion’ and this takes place in the 
context of the division of labour, what every man is ‘to enjoy’ are not, strictly 
speaking, his necessaries etc., but rather (and particularly so if one thinks of the verb 
‘to purchase’ before the verb ‘to enjoy’) a share of the necessaries etc. available in 
the economy in a period of time (namely a share of the ‘wealth or revenue’ -to use 
Smith’s repeated expression- of the whole society). In this sense the eventual impact 
of Smith’s statement was to obscure, rather than to clarify, what Smith himself brings 
to light in other parts of his work, namely the distinction between the wealth of an 
individual and the wealth of the whole society: whilst the former consists of exchange 
values (the typical object of purchase and sale) the latter consists of use values (the 
typical object of production and consumption). 
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The scope of this distinction, on which Malthus was to cast his own ray of light 
when he pointed out that value “is not only the great stimulus to the production of all 
kinds of wealth, but the great regulator of the forms and relative quantities in which it 
shall exist” (Malthus, 1836, Ch.VI), is blurred by Smith one page later when he writes 
that “wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power”. For, granted that Smith qualifies this 
statement by pointing out the obvious, namely that the power conveyed by wealth is 
not a political but just a market power, he fails to qualify it to the extent of making it 
clear that the power conferred by wealth in this sense is -to be as precise as Smith 
himself is with regard to the distinction between a political and a market power- the 
power of purchasing rather than the power of enjoying goods. 
The relationship between wealth in the sense of purchasing and wealth in the 
sense of enjoying, and therefore between wealth in the sense of exchange values 
and wealth in the sense of use values, was highlighted by De Quincey (1844, Ch.I). 
After arguing that value in use, ‘the original element’, may be viewed in two states, 
i.e. either totally disengaged from ‘the secondary element’, value in exchange, or as 
not disengaged from this element; this author proceeds to ask: “What name does it 
take in the first state, where it is wholly disengaged from the power of purchasing? 
Answer -[and let the reader weigh this well]- it takes the name of wealth”. De 
Quincey’s argument is aimed to stress that there is a complete coincidence between 
the terms wealth and use values, and that the difference between riches and value is 
nothing but the difference between wealth and exchange values. Since, however, De 
Quincey adds that this difference may also be expressed in the sense that the 
concept of value in exchange does, while the concept of wealth does not, involve the 
idea of property (an important point usually neglected in the literature on value and 
riches and in turn obscured by Smith’s use of the verb ‘to enjoy’ instead of the verb 
‘to purchase’) it follows that the concept of use values is associated in his argument 
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with the idea of national wealth as much as the concept of exchange values is 
associated with the idea of individual wealth. 
De Quincey’s insight serves to bring to light two crucial aspects of this crucial 
question. One is that Smith’s concern in his famous statement is with the concept of 
value in exchange (as indicated by the very title of the chapter where this statement 
is put forward) rather than with the concept of value in use (and therefore with the 
wealth of an individual rather than with the wealth of society). Another is that the 
meaning of the whole statement would be best conveyed if it were reworded, for 
instance, as follows: ‘unlike the whole society, a man is rich or poor according to the 
degree in which he can exchange the articles of wealth in his possession for the 
articles of wealth annually available in the economy and normally (i.e. in so far as 
they are the result of human exertion) in the possession of other men’. 
It should be added, however, that Smith’s obscurities may lie less in his text than 
in the minds of his followers and critics. Consider, for instance, Ricardo himself. In his 
attempt to clear up this issue Ricardo rightly argues that “the man in possession of a 
scarce commodity is richer, if by means of it he can command more of the 
necessaries and enjoyments of human life” and that “as the general stock out of 
which each man’s riches are drawn is diminished in quantity, by all that any individual 
takes from it, other men’s shares must necessarily be reduced” (which implies that 
changes in exchange values alter the distribution of national wealth amongst 
individuals). But he continues by stating that “riches do not depend on value”, and by 
rewording Smith’s statement in the different sense that “a man is rich or poor 
according to the abundance of necessaries and luxuries which he can command; and 
whether the exchangeable value of these for money, for corn, or for labour, be high 
or low, they will equally contribute to the enjoyment of their possessor” (italics 
added). Now it cannot be denied that wealth as power of enjoying does not change 
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when the exchange values of its elements do. But, if this were the case, Ricardo’s 
very sentence should in turn be reworded in the different sense that “a man is rich or 
poor according to the abundance of necessaries and luxuries which he can enjoy”. 
For it is true that, once the amount of these necessaries etc. is given, the enjoyment 
they procure to their possessor remains unchanged whatever happens to their 
exchange values. But the real problem tackled by Smith in his ambiguous statement 
concerns the question of how this amount is determined, and not of whether, once 
this amount is determined, the corresponding wealth changes with any change in the 
exchange values of its elements. In this sense the essence of Smith’s statement 
seems to be that the amount of necessaries etc. that a man can enjoy depends on 
how much of them this man can command by giving in exchange the articles of 
wealth (be they money, corn or labour, to use Ricardo’s examples) which are in his 
possession. 
It can be concluded, therefore, that wealth does depend on (exchange) value in 
so far as it is intended as the wealth of an individual, and does not depend on 
(exchange) value in so far as it is intended as the wealth of the whole society (use 
values): while wealth in the second sense can increase -as Ricardo quite consistently 
points out- only as a result of the accumulation of capital and of technical progress, 
wealth in the first sense may increase or decrease as a result, for instance, of an 
increase or decrease in the difficulty of production of particular commodities owned 
by particular individuals or social classes (rentiers, in the first place). 
Ricardo’s discussion of the distinction between value and riches attains a 
maximum of consistency when he turns against Say’s ‘unfortunate’ discussion of this 
very distinction (Say, 1814). It should be pointed out, however, that this maximum is 
reached not so much in the passage where Say is criticized for considering these two 
terms as synonymous (for what Say has here in mind is the wealth of an individual 
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and not, as Ricardo and De Quincey do, that of society) but in the final part of 
Chapter XX of the Principles where Say is shown to overlook the “essential 
difference” between value in use and value in exchange. In this final part of his 
chapter Ricardo seems to imply that what Say ultimately overlooks is, behind the 
essential difference between value in use and value in exchange, the even more 
essential difference between the wealth of an individual and that of society. This 
implication is developed, first, with regard to the role assigned by Say, in contrast 
with Smith, to “natural agents” in the determination of values (for, as Ricardo points 
out, natural agents may add to use values but not to exchange values); and, 
secondly, to the contradictions resulting from Say’s notion that “the riches of a 
society” are composed of “the sum total of the values which it possesses”, a notion 
which incorporates all the ambiguities discussed above and particularly the confusion 
between value in use and value in exchange (Ricardo, 1821, 287-8, n.1). 
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